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SENATE

REPORT
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# SUPPLEMENTAL FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1990

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JUNE 18 (legislative day, JUNE 11), 1990.—Ordered to be printed

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Mr. PELL, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the following

## REPORT

together with

## MINORITY VIEWS

[To accompany S. 2749]

The Committee on Foreign Relations having had under consideration an original bill to provide supplemental authorization of appropriations for fiscal year 1991 for the Department of State, United States Information Agency, and for other purposes, reports favorably thereon and recommends that the bill do pass.

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## Purpose of the Bill

The principal purpose of this bill is to provide supplemental authorization of appropriations for fiscal year 1991 for the Department of State and the United States Information Agency.

## Summary of Funding Provisions

The Committee bill authorizes the appropriation of an additional $615,688,000 for the State Department and an additional $1,861,000 for the United States Information Agency for the Voice of America Cuba program. The chart below shows the breakdown among the various State Department accounts.

FISCAL YEAR 1991 AUTHORIZATION REQUEST—DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[In thousands of dollars]

| | Fiscal year 1990 appropriation enacted | Fiscal year 1991 authorization enacted | Fiscal year 1991 authorization request | Fiscal year 1991 SFRC recommendation | Fiscal year 1991 recommendation vs. fiscal year 1991 authorization enacted | Fiscal year 1991 recommendation vs. fiscal year 1991 authorization request |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Administration of foreign affairs: | | | | | | |
| Salaries and expenses—Nonsecurity | 1,432,124 | 1,583,598 | 1,607,423 | 1,615,423 | 31,825 | 8,000 |
| Salaries and expenses—Security | 309,365 | 361,995 | 361,995 | 361,955 | 0 | 0 |
| Subtotal, salaries and expenses | 1,741,489 | 1,945,593 | 1,969,418 | 1,977,418 | 31,825 | 8,000 |
| Office of the Inspector General | 21,000 | 21,840 | 23,301 | 23,301 | 1,461 | 0 |
| Acquisition and maintenance of buildings abroad | 218,900 | 227,656 | 587,775 | 317,156 | 89,500 | —270,619 |
| Representation allowances | 4,600 | 5,000 | 5,000 | 5,000 | 0 | 0 |
| Protection of foreign missions and officials | 9,100 | 9,464 | 9,464 | 9,464 | 0 | 0 |

FISCAL YEAR 1991 AUTHORIZATION REQUEST—DEPARTMENT OF STATE—Continued

[In thousands of dollars]

| | Fiscal year 1990 appropriation enacted | Fiscal year 1991 authorization enacted | Fiscal year 1991 authorization request | Fiscal year 1991 SFRC recommendation | Fiscal year 1991 recommendation vs. fiscal year 1991 authorization enacted | Fiscal year 1991 recommendation vs. fiscal year 1991 authorization request |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Emergencies in Diplomatic and Consular service | 4,700 | 4,888 | 6,600 | 6,600 | 1,712 | 0 |
| American Institute in Taiwan | 11,300 | 11,752 | 12,000 | 14,000 | 2,248 | 2,000 |
| Subtotal, administration of foreign affairs | 269,600 | 280,600 | 644,140 | 375,521 | 94,921 | —268,619 |
| International organizations: | | | | | | |
| International organizations | 714,927 | 817,000 | 1,158,481 | 1,158,481 | 341,481 | 0 |
| International peacekeeping activities | 111,184 | 115,000 | 247,423 | 247,423 | 132,423 | 0 |
| International conferences and contingencies | 6,340 | 7,300 | 8,200 | 8,200 | 900 | 0 |
| Subtotal, international organizations | 832,451 | 939,300 | 1,414,104 | 1,414,104 | 474,804 | 0 |
| International commissions: | | | | | | |
| International boundary and water commissions—Salaries and expenses | 10,460 | 10,878 | 10,878 | 10,878 | 0 | 0 |
| International boundary and water commissions—Construction | 11,500 | 11,900 | 11,900 | 11,900 | 0 | 0 |
| American sections: IBC | 750 | 780 | 780 | 780 | 0 | 0 |
| American sections: IJC | 3,750 | 3,900 | 3,900 | 3,900 | 0 | 0 |
| International Fisheries Commissions | 11,000 | 11,440 | 11,400 | 18,840 | 7,400 | 7,400 |
| Subtotal, international commissions | 37,460 | 38,898 | 38,898 | 46,298 | 7,400 | 7,400 |
| Other programs: | | | | | | |
| U.S. bilateral salary and expense agreements | 4,000 | 4,160 | 5,000 | 5,000 | 840 | 0 |
| Soviet and East European research | 4,600 | 5,200 | 5,200 | 5,200 | 0 | 0 |
| The Asia Foundation | 13,900 | 18,000 | 18,000 | 18,000 | 0 | 0 |
| Subtotal, other programs | 22,500 | 27,360 | 28,200 | 28,200 | 840 | 0 |
| Migration and refugee assistance | 415,000 | 470,000 | 450,648 | 450,898 | 5,898 | 0 |
| Total, Department of State authorization | 3,318,500 | 3,676,751 | 4,545,408 | 4,292,439 | 615,688 | —252,969 |

## COMMITTEE COMMENTS

1. *International Organizations.*—This bill endorses President George Bush's request that the Congress authorize the payment of all U.S. arrearages to the United Nations. Assistant Secretary of State John Bolton testified before the Foreign Relations Committee that the decision to seek full payment of past U.S. dues to the United Nations was the personal decision of President Bush. According to Secretary Bolton, President Bush made this decision out of a sense of commitment to the vastly more important role of the United Nations in a changing world and in spite of other important competing budgetary claims.

The committee shares President Bush's belief in the United Nations. Over the last several years the United Nations has begun to meet the idealistic aspirations that its founders had for it. In April 1988, a United Nations mediation effort produced an agreement resulting in the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. On August 20, 1988, a United Nations mandated cease-fire took place in the Iran-Iraq war thus bringing to a close the longest lasting, bloodiest, and most dangerous international conflict since World War II. In February 1990, a United Nations election observer mission had a decisive role in ensuring that Nicaraguan elections were free and fair. These elections resulted in the ouster of the Sandinista government and its replacement by a pro-Western democratic administration. In March 1990, the United Nations supervised the transition of the territory of Namibia from an illegally occupied colony to an independent multiparty democratic nation.

In each case the United Nations was critical to achieving outcomes long sought by American policymakers. These outcomes are also producing a more peaceful and democratic world.

As compared with the results achieved, the committee believes that the United States contributions to the United Nations are a great bargain. For example, the Persian Gulf war was costing the American taxpayer in excess of $300 million a year in increased naval patrols. In addition, the war jeopardized Western access to oil reserves vital to our economies and directly jeopardized the lives of American citizens in the region. By contrast, the United States share of United Nations peacekeeping in the Persian Gulf is in the neighborhood of $15 million a year. It is impossible to calculate the national security benefit of this $15 million but such sums could be in the tens of billions.

For 5 years the United States has been paying only a fraction of its assessed contributions to the United Nations and other international organizations. This has placed us in violation of our treaty commitments and has put the country in the embarrassing position of being the world's greatest deadbeat.

Most serious, the U.S. failure to pay its current and past obligations to the United Nations could jeopardize future United Nations peacekeeping activities. United Nations Secretary General Perez de Cuellar recently told the Foreign Relations Committee that without the U.S. payment the United Nations could not undertake a peacekeeping and election organizing role in Cambodia. Quite simply, the Secretary General said, "The United Nations does not have the cash reserves for a Cambodia operation. Thus, the U.S. failure to meet its obligations could conceivably prolong the conflict in Cambodia with the attendant risk that the murderous Khmer Rouge might again seize power."

The committee notes that many of the conditions that led the Congress to withhold a portion of the U.S. contribution to the United Nations no longer exist. According to Secretary Bolton, the United Nations and most affiliated agencies have made significant progress in implementing major budgetary and administrative reform. With the dramatic developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the United Nations General Assembly is no longer a forum for anti-Western rhetoric. Rather, the General Assembly and other United Nations bodies are increasingly serving as a vehi-

cle to promote human rights, democracy, environmental protection, and other causes long on the Western agenda. Many initiatives in these areas are being undertaken in conjunction with the Soviet Union and the formerly Communist nations of Eastern Europe.

The authorization of the payment of U.S. arrearages to the United Nations is the single most important feature of this bill. The committee has strongly supported President Bush's decision to make these payments and urges the Senate to do likewise.

2. *The United States Embassy in Moscow.*—On a 16–0 rollcall vote the committee rejected the administration's proposal to tear down the unfinished U.S. chancery building in Moscow and to build a new building on the site. Instead, the committee voted funds to complete the unfinished building for use for unclassified activities and to provide additional secure space in the old chancery or elsewhere in the U.S. Embassy compound. The committee provision, authored by Senator Moynihan, will save the taxpayers $220 million as compared with the administration proposal.

The Moscow construction project has been a fiasco from the day President Nixon signed an agreement with Soviet President Brezhnev that did not provide adequate safeguards to prevent Soviet penetration of the new chancery building. In the construction phase, Soviet workers were permitted by the State Department to facilitate the insertion of bugging devices into the building. Now, as with the savings and loan scandal, the taxpayer is being asked to bailout a series of inattentive administrations and State Department bureaucrats. The cost of this bailout, if the administration were to have its way, would be at least $270 million, the amount of the administration's request.

The end of the cold war has produced an enormous growth in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. The lifting of most restrictions on the travel and emigration of Soviet citizens has produced a quantum leap in the demands on U.S. consular and visa services. Economic reform in the Soviet Union is creating new opportunities for American business. Similarly, the new United States-U.S.S.R. relationship has produced a mushrooming of official and unofficial exchange and cultural programs. All this activity has vastly increased the need for office space in Moscow. These kinds of activities do not require secure or classified space. Thus, the new chancery building can be effectively utilized upon completion for unclassified activities.

Completion of the existing building for unclassified purposes would cost between $35 and $40 million. The $10–15 millions in additional funds in this authorization are to be used to provide more space for secure conversations and activities in the old chancery building and in other facilities on the compound. Over the long term the committee would consider a proposal to build a new secure annex on the existing compound or on land that the United States is now negotiating to acquire.

Tearing down the existing building and starting over on the same foundation, as the administration proposes, would not provide any greater security than under the committee authorized plan. Soviet intelligence agencies would still have access to the foundation. On the other hand, the expenditure of more than one-quarter of a billion dollars on tearing down an existing building would be

an advertisement of American incompetence and wasteful of nearly as much money as the administration would spend to help secure democracy throughout Eastern Europe.

3. *Consulates and Embassy Construction.*—An ever greater proportion of the State Department budget is being devoted to construction of new and very expensive embassies. Partly as a result of the diversion of resources to construction, there is inadequate funding to maintain existing posts throughout the world. In essence, the country faces a choice between a limited diplomatic representation abroad with all missions being built to the costly physical and technical security standards outlined in the 1985 Inman report and a much more extensive diplomatic representation in which not all posts are up to the highest standards for physical and technical security.

The committee recognizes the importance of adequately protecting American diplomats in foreign countries and continues to support strongly the construction of missions able to withstand the physical and technical security threat that exists in the country where the mission is located. However, not every post faces the same level of physical security threat nor does every post require classified communications.

The design and construction decisions about new U.S. Mission buildings should reflect the nature of the physical threat in a country, the importance of U.S. interests in the country, and the need for classified activity. Given very limited resources, the U.S. cannot afford to build bomb-proof fortresses in places where there is no significant risk of car bomb terrorist attack. In the case of a high threat country where U.S. interests are relatively minimal, the cost-effective solution may be to have no diplomatic representation at all. In some cases, a post is so marginal that it does not justify the expense of maintaining classified communication. However, an unclassified presence may be preferable to no presence at all. Of course, in critical posts where there is also a high threat, for example as exists in much of the Middle East, the Committee strongly supports the building of the most secure possible embassies.

The committee reduced funding for the construction of a new embassy chancery at Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, from $15 million to $3 million. This reflects the Committee's concern about the high cost of providing Inman-guideline security at marginal posts that are in low threat environments. In Papua New Guinea, foreign diplomats are at risk from crime not terrorism. The $15 million proposed for a new embassy building would provide no protection to embassy officers who are at risk in their homes and on the streets, but not in the embassy building.

The committee notes that the Port Moresby project was intended to be the pilot program for a new method of constructing so-called small embassies using pre-engineered components to build embassies that meet modified Inman security standards. It is not clear that this approach will entail any significant savings and the Port Moresby project has already increased in price from $12 million to $15 million.

More important, the costs for this ostensibly cost-saving pilot program are far out of line of the construction costs of other countries. The United Kingdom, whose interests in Papua New Guinea

are more significant than those of the United States, recently completed construction of a new High Commission building for under $1 million. The Committee believes that this is a solid indication that substantial savings can be realized over the Administration proposal for Port Moresby and that the $3 million figure is a generous one.

Because the Port Moresby example is not an isolated case, the Committee urges the State Department to undertake a comprehensive reassessment of the goals of the diplomatic security program with respect to physical and technical security standards at low threat and low interest posts.

The funds saved by capping the Port Moresby project are to be used to keep open consulates in Western Europe. West European consulates have been slated for closing so as to open new consulates in Eastern Europe.

For 12 years the Committee has been approving legislation designed to defeat Administration proposals to close consulates. The committee believes that embassies and consulates abroad are the most cost-effective means of promoting U.S. interests and values. The senior American official in any city is inevitably one of the key persons in the economic, political, and social life of the city. The Committee believes that, with the dramatic changes in Europe, now is the time to raise the American flag around the world and not, as the Administration would, pull it down. The Committee endorses the opening of new consulates in Eastern Europe but believes these new consulates should not come at the expense of existing ones.

4. *Protection of the Great Lakes and America's Waterways.*—At the request of Senator Moynihan, the committee's bill incorporates an increase in funding for sea lamprey and zebra mussel control. These aquatic pests pose a serious threat to the Great Lakes and, in the case of the zebra mussel, to waterways throughout the United States. The committee believes that action to control these pests now is one of the most cost-effective and timely of measures that could be taken to protect the environment and quality of life of American communities along the Great Lakes and other bodies of water.

The committee's bill authorizes an increase in funding for U.S. contributions to the Great Lakes Fishery Commission of $5,400,000, from a total of $11,440,000 to $18,840,000. Of this latter amount, $6,640,000 shall be available for the Commission's Sea Lamprey Control Program, and $6,000,000 shall be available for the purpose of implementing a Zebra Mussel Control Program.

Sea lampreys are a marine invader in the Great Lakes and devastated fisheries there in the 1940's and 1950's. As a result of a successful Sea Lamprey Control Program, Great Lakes fisheries rebounded from the devastation caused by the sea lampreys. The annual value of the sport and commercial fishing activities is estimated to be $4.67 billion and supports 84,000 jobs.

Due to increases in the cost of sea lampricide, this recovery is now threatened. Without the increased funding, sea lamprey control will be reduced and the sea lamprey population could rebound, causing a severe loss in commercial fishing jobs and revenue.

The zebra mussel is a comparatively new problem in the Great Lakes having first arrived in 1986. Zebra mussels multiply rapidly—each adult female can produce as much as 30,000 to 40,000 eggs per year—and attach themselves to the interior surfaces of pipes reducing pipe diameter and flow capacity. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service estimates that, if left uncontrolled, zebra mussels in the Great Lakes will cost $5 billion over the next 10 years and are likely to spread throughout waterways across the United States.

The committee is firmly convinced that the increased authorization for controlling both the sea lamprey and the zebra mussel is crucial to maintaining jobs and businesses throughout the Great Lakes region.

*Simon Study on U.S. Overseas Security Commitment.*—The committee believes that U.S. security commitments overseas should be reexamined in light of significant changes occurring in Eastern and Central Europe, the Soviet Union, Central America, the Pacific Rim countries, and Southern Africa. Many of the commitments that the United States undertook following World War II are still in place today, based on a military containment strategy toward the Soviet Union that is in need of review and, very possibly, replacement by new security structures and strategies now that superpower politics have greatly improved. Moreover, our share of the world economy has declined from roughly 40 to 20 percent, and this too will eventually affect our security commitments and our capability to maintain large bases and facilities abroad.

At Senator Simon's request, the committee agreed to undertake a staff study to reexamine the premises of U.S. security commitments, particularly longstanding alliance relationships, base rights agreements and related executive agreements, and whether it makes sense to continue these commitments in their present form. It is the committee's intention to issue a public report following completion of the study.

*Report on the "Early Warning System."*—The committee requests the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (AID) to report to the committee no later than August 1, 1990, on: No. 1, the Agency's plans for the Early Project Notification System, commonly known as the "early warning system"; No. 2, the level of resources that will be provided to the system through the end of 1992; and No. 3, staffing levels necessary to ensure that the system will provide a thorough review of the possible environmental impacts of multilateral development bank (MDB) loans. The committee makes this request because it is convinced of the importance of the "early warning system" in helping to identify and prevent loans by the MDB's for environmentally damaging projects.

In Section 1303(c) of the International Financial Institutions Act (Public Law 95–118), the Congress directed AID to compile a list of proposed loans by MDB's that may cause damage to the environment, natural resources, public health or indigenous peoples. The list is developed on the basis of information gathered through the early warning system from a number of sources, including U.S.A.I.D. missions, nongovernmental organizations, and multilateral and bilateral institutions from around the world.

The system is the only monitoring system of its kind worldwide. By providing advance warning on the adverse impact of MDB

loans, the early warning system is instrumental in providing initial background information to a wide range of interested parties. Despite its limited size, the early warning system has proven to be an important mechanism in helping to improve the environmental performance of the MDB's.

The committee is very concerned that AID has not made a firm commitment to extend support for the system beyond its expiration date in December 1990. the committee urges the administrator to extend the program by increasing the number of full-time staff positions with responsibility for monitoring MDB loans and by increasing financial support for the system's operation. This is particularly important since the IDA-9 replenishment and the creation of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development are likely to add substantially to the demands placed on the system. The committee notes that the current Administrator of AID stated in his confirmation hearing that the early warning system works well and that he hoped it would continue.

Environmental reforms announced by the MDB's are in large measure the results of years of work by Congress to promote sound environmental standards for bank lending. The committee believes the early warning system will play a vital role in the continuing efforts to monitor and improve the environmental performance of MDB lending.

## Committee Action

S. 2296, to authorize supplemental appropriations for fiscal year 1991 for the Department of State, was introduced by Senator Pell by request of the executive branch on March 20, 1990. The bill was referred to the Foreign Relations Committee, and it was included virtually intact in an original committee bill.

The U.S. Information Agency submitted a formal request for authorization of supplemental appropriations on May 23. Despite the lateness of its receipt, much of the request was included in an original committee bill.

The Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on S. 2296, the administration's request for the State Department. Undersecretary of State for Management Ivan Selin and Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs John Bolton provided oral and written testimony on the request. Undersecretary of State Selin was accompanied by Jill Kent, Chief Financial Officer, and Richard Dertadian, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Buildings Operations.

On June 7, the committee met to mark up a bill. At the conclusion of the markup, the committee voted 12-5 to report favorably an original bill. Senators Pell, Biden, Sarbanes, Cranston, Dodd, Kerry, Simon, Sanford, Moynihan, Robb, Murkowski, and McConnell voted aye. Senators Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, Pressler, and Humphrey voted nay.

During the course of the markup, the following recorded votes were taken on:

A motion made by Senator Boschwitz to strike authorizations for a $1.4 million funding increase for the Great Lakes Fishery Commission's Sea Lamprey Control Program and $6

million to create a Great Lakes Fishery Commission control program for zebra mussels was defeated, 3–14. Ayes: Senators Helms, Boschwitz, and Pressler. Nays: Senators Pell, Biden, Sarbanes, Cranston, Dodd, Kerry, Simon, Sanford, Moynihan, Robb, Lugar, Kassebaum, Murkowski, and McConnell.

A motion made by Senator Lugar to strike a provision that would authorize an additional $9.5 million to open new consulates in Eastern Europe and prohibit the expenditure of funds authorized by the supplemental authorization bill, other than the $9.5 million for consulates in Eastern Europe, if any consulates in Western Europe are closed was defeated, 8–10. Ayes: Senators Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler, Murkowski, McConnell, and Mack. Nays: Senators Pell, Biden, Sarbanes, Cranston, Dodd, Kerry, Simon, Sanford, Moynihan, and Robb.

An amendment offered by Senator Moynihan to authorize $50 million of the funds authorized in the acquisition and maintenance of buildings abroad account to be used to complete the new U.S. chancery building in Moscow and to provide additional secure space was adopted, 16–0. This amendment was substituted for an administration request of $270 million to tear down the unfinished chancery and construct a new, secure chancery in Moscow and such other facilities as may be appropriate. Ayes: Senators Pell, Biden, Sarbanes, Cranston, Dodd, Kerry, Simon, Sanford, Moynihan, Robb, Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, Pressler, Murkowski, and McConnell.

## Section-by-Section Analysis

### TITLE I—THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

#### *Part A—Authorization of Appropriations; Allocation of Funds; Restrictions*

*Section 101—Administration of Foreign Affairs*

This section authorizes the appropriation of an additional $618,000,000 for fiscal year 1991 for the account entitled "Administration of Foreign Affairs" to carry out the authorities, functions, and responsibilities of the Department of State in the conduct of foreign affairs.

Subsection (a) authorizes the appropriation of the administration's request for $1,615,423,000 to provide for salaries and expenses not related to the Diplomatic Security Program. This increase will allow the Department to return to the 1989 method of billing other agencies for certain overseas administrative costs.

In its 1990 budget request, the Department proposed having other agencies reimburse the State Department for additional services under the Foreign Affairs Administration Support System (FAAS) that previously were funded by the salaries and expenses account. The cost of these services, $68 million, was not included in the 1990 appropriations request and was not funded. Implementation of the expanded FAAS system in 1990 has been impeded by legislative restrictions that may limit the amount of reimbursements the two largest FAAS clients, the U.S. Information Agency

and the Agency for International Development, could pay to the Department. The loss of these reimbursements places considerable strain on the Department's budgetary reserves and threatens its ability to provide overseas services. As a result, the administration believes that to ensure stable funding for overseas administrative support, funding should be centralized within the Department of State and adequate funds returned to the salaries and expenses base to cover the cost of providing these services.

Subsection (b) authorizes the appropriation of $317,156,000 for the acquisition and maintenance of buildings abroad. This funding level is designed to accommodate a $50 million program to complete construction of the new Moscow Embassy and to provide for construction of secure office space inside the existing building or elsewhere on the Embassy compound. In addition, this funding level provides $1.5 million for the acquisition and maintenance of new consulate space in Eastern Europe, and $12 million for the Facility Rehabilitation and Support Systems Replacement Program, a new initiative by the Foreign Buildings Office to develop a more systematic approach to addressing maintenance requirements of facilities in the FBO's inventory of U.S. Government-owned and long-term leased buildings. This initiative is responsive to recommendations made by the U.S. General Accounting Office and the State Department's Office of Inspector General. The remainder, $26 million, is provided to cover other functional programs designed to improve maintenance of facilities abroad.

Subsection (c) authorizes the appropriation of the administration's request for $6,600,000 for emergencies in diplomatic and consular services. The committee supports this increase partially because of the dramatic increase in evacuations which occurred in 1989. More emergency situations are expected in 1991. In addition, the authorization provides funding to operate a toll-free line which will provide information concerning the welfare and whereabouts of American citizens abroad during times of crisis.

Subsection (d) authorizes the appropriation of the administration's request for $23,301,000 for the Office of Inspector General. This level of funding will provide for the use of independent certified public accounting firms to supplement limited OIG staff in the area of financial audits, economy and efficiency audits, and critical followup work on previous audit recommendations.

Subsection (e) authorizes $14,000,000 for the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT). The administration requested $12,000,000 for AIT. The committee recommends an authorization of $14,000,000 for operating funds for AIT to upgrade commercial functions and meet other requirements. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 requires that AIT's commercial section function on a level equal to that of the commercial section in the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, Korea. Additional staff would be required to achieve this. In addition, as a result of a change to the Taiwan Social Security Act, the American Institute in Taiwan is legally required to begin funding accrued liabilities for the Foreign National Retirement Program which covers Taiwanese employees. Finally, AIT has been adversely affected by currency fluctuations.

*Section 102—Contributions to International Organizations and Conferences*

This section authorizes appropriations to cover the President's decision to seek payment of all arrearages owed to international organizations. The administration has announced its plans to pay at 20 percent a year over 5 years. However, funds are authorized to remain available until expended. The arrearages will be directed toward special activities that are eventually agreed upon by the United States and the respective international organization.

Subsection (a) authorizes $1,158,481,000 for the U.S. contributions to international organizations.

Subsection (b) authorizes $247,423,000 for contributions to international peacekeeping activities.

Subsection (c) authorizes $8,200,000 for international conferences and contingencies. In addition to the payment of arrearages, this level of funding provides for the anticipated increase in costs of expanded activities of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

*Section 103—International Commissions*

This provision, sponsored by Senator Moynihan, authorizes the appropriation of $18,840,000 in subsection (a) for the International Fisheries Commissions. Subsection (b) makes funding available for to the following programs developed to combat aquatic pests in the Great Lakes:

$6,640,000 of the amount authorized in subsection (a) for the Great Lakes Fishery Commission's Sea Lamprey Control Program.

$6,000,000 of the amount authorized in subsection (a) to establish a program for the management and control of zebra mussels in the Great Lakes.

*Section 104—Migration and Refugee Assistance*

This section authorizes $450,898,000 for migration and refugee assistance. The committee recognizes the continuing need to support emigration and refugee resettlement.

*Section 105—United States Bilateral Science and Technology Agreements*

This section authorizes funding for the U.S. Bilateral Science and Technology Program. This funding level includes funding for a new agreement with Hungary as well as existing agreements with Yugoslavia and Poland.

*Section 106—Permanent International Association of Road Congresses*

This section removes the 1926 $3,000 per year statutory cap on U.S. Government contributions to the Permanent International Association of Road Congresses (PIARC) and authorizes "such sums as may be necessary" to pay U.S. dues to the organization. The 1991 assessed contribution is $13,000.

*Section 107—Moscow Embassy Construction and Security*

This provision authorizes the appropriation of $50,000,000 of the amount authorized for the acquisition and maintenance of buildings abroad under section 101(b) to complete the new chancery building in Moscow and to procure additional secure space either in the existing office building or elsewhere in the compound. This provision was offered in committee markup by Senator Moynihan as an amendment, and it enjoyed the unanimous support of 16 Members who voted in person or by proxy. It is not the intention of the committee to mandate the location or the form of the additional space, but rather to allow the State Department flexibility to decide the most appropriate means of providing adequate secure space without tearing down the new chancery building.

The committee considered and rejected the Department's request for $270,000,000 to tear the new chancery down to the foundation and reconstruct it on the same site. The $50,000,000 provided is based on earlier cost estimates of a plan to replace the top three floors of the new chancery and build a secure annex as well as the State Department's estimate of the cost of completing the new chancery.

*Section 108—Opening Consulates in Eastern Europe*

This provision, authored by the chairman, is designed to ensure that new consulates in Eastern Europe are not opened at the expense of much needed consulates in Western Europe.

Subsection (a) provides $8,000,000 of the amount authorized for "Salaries and Expenses" in section 101(a) and $1,500,000 of the amount authorized for "Acquisition of and Maintenance Buildings Abroad" in section 101(b) for the operation and maintenance of new consulate facilities in Eastern Europe.

Subsection (b) provides that none of the funds authorized by the supplemental authorization bill for fiscal year 1991, other than those authorized in subsection (a) will be available for obligation or expenditure if the U.S. Government closes any consulates in Western Europe.

*Section 109—Reprogramming of Funding for U.S. Embassies and Consulates*

This provision, authored by the Chairman, places an cap on the embassy construction project in Port Moresby Papua New Guinea and makes the remaining project funds available for maintaining consulates in Western Europe.

Subsection (a) limits the funding of the U.S. construction project in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea to $3,000,000.

Subsection (b) waives Sections 402 and 403 of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Authorization of 1986 (the Inman legislation) and any provisions and regulations promulgated pursuant to those sections of law if the security requirements associated with them cannot be accommodated within the $3,000,000 funding cap. This provision also stipulates that classified activities shall not be conducted in the chancery if facilities needed to support such activities cannot be built within the authorized project cost.

Subsection (c) provides that funds allocated by the Department of State for the Port Moresby project be reprogrammed for the maintenance of consulates in Western Europe.

*Section 110—Authorization of Appropriations for Displaced Burmese*

This section, sponsored by Senator Moynihan, clarifies an ambiguity in existing legislation and authorizes additional funds for refugee assistance.

Subsection (a) specifies that 1990 funds available for Burmese refugees may be used to assist any person in Burma or in Thailand who has been displaced as a result of events relating to the civil conflict in Burma.

Subsection (b) authorizes the appropriation of $250,000 of the funds provided in section 104(2) for humanitarian assistance for Burmese refugees.

*Section 111—Increased Authority To Reimburse State and Local Governments for Certain Local Services*

This section raises the authorization level of reimbursement the State Department can make to local governments for providing protection of diplomatic facilities. The Congress acknowledges that providing protection for diplomatic facilities is a Federal function. In recent months, the number of protest rallies and special events at the United Nations has increased. This past year, the city of New York spent more than $9,000,000 on United Nations protection activities. The current authorization level of $7,000,000 was set in 1982. Since that time, the cost of providing protection has increased significantly, and the current authorization level no longer allows full reimbursement to State and local governments for providing protection.

Subsection (a) raises the authorization to $10,000,000 for 1990.

Subsection (b) raises the authorization to $10,000,000 permanently.

Subsection (c) makes a technical correction to the existing law.

*Section 112—United States and Soviet Exchange of Consulates*

This provision, sponsored by Senator Murkowski, urges the Secretary of State to begin negotiations to establish consulates in Anchorage, Alaska and in Khabarovsk, U.S.S.R. The provision further requires a report on these negotiations and on the demand for transportation between and consular services in the Western United States and the Soviet Far East.

During the June 1990 Bush-Gorbachev summit in Washington, the United States and the Soviet Union concluded an agreement greatly expanding the air and sea transportation between the United States and the Soviet Union, including for the first time, trans-Pacific routes. This provision is designed to facilitate contact between the citizens of the United States and the Soviet Union and to encourage followup on discussions between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev.

*Section 113—Resumption of Publication of the "Department of State Bulletin"*

This provision, authored by the Chairman, requires that the Department of State resume publication of the Department of State Bulletin. The State Department canceled the Bulletin in December 1989. For 50 years, the Bulletin had been a valuable resource for libraries, scholars, students, and the general public. The Bulletin served as the official record of U.S. foreign policy and contained major addresses, news conferences, testimony before congressional committees, press releases, treaties and other international agreements, and other important materials. The committee feels strongly that such a publication is of inherent value to both the public and to the State Department and should be reinstated.

*Section 114—The "Foreign Relations of the United States" Historical Series*

This provision, sponsored by the chairman, sets up a system for review of documents to ensure that the Foreign Relations Historical Series constitutes an authoritative and complete diplomatic record. The provision establishes a Historians Advisory Committee to review documents that may be withheld. The provision includes language to protect military secrets and to protect the identity of living persons who supplied the United States with confidential information. It makes all documents, aside from those within the scope of the statutory exceptions or excepted by the Historians Advisory Committee, subject to public access after 40 years.

TITLE II—UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

*Section 201—Radio Broadcasting to Cuba*

This section authorizes $15,069,000 for the Voice of America Cuba service.

*Section 202—Voice of America Broadcasts in Kurdish*

This section mandates Voice of America broadcasts in Kurdish.

*Section 203—International Expositions*

This section expands the existing authorization of $7,400,000 for U.S. participation in the 1992 Seville World's Fair to include participation in the 1992 Genoa Fair.

*Section 204—Extension of Au Pair Programs*

This section provides for the continuation of U.S. Information Agency au pair programs until such time as another agency is authorized to implement the programs.

TITLE III—MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

*Section 301—Prohibition on Assistance for the Missile Program of the People's Republic of China*

This provision, offered by Senator Helms, prohibits all U.S. assistance to any missile program of the People's Republic of China and revokes any previously authorized export of United States satellites to be launched from Chinese missiles until the President cer-

tifies to the Congress that China is not supplying ballistic missiles, missile technology, or poison gas to certain countries in the Middle East.

*Section 302—Certificate of Legal Origin for Certain Fish Products*

This provision, offered by Senator Murkowski, institutes a certificate of origin requirement for certain fish products.

Subsection (a) requires the Secretary of State to negotiate with nations which import or export salmon and steelhead for the purpose of obtaining an international agreement on the adoption of a certificate of legal origin requirement for all salmon and steelhead being traded by such nations.

Subsection (b) specifies the requirements for issuing a valid certificate.

Subsection (c) gives the Secretary of State discretion to pursue bilateral or multilateral agreements to achieve these purposes.

Subsection (d) requires the Secretary of Commerce, within 180 days of the enactment of this section, to promulgate regulations to institute the issuance of certificates for such species legally harvested by U.S. vessels.

Subsection (e) requires the Secretary of Commerce, after consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, to report to Congress on whether or not the United States should adopt import/export restrictions, that is, a certificate requirement, similar to those negotiated by the Secretary of State under subsection (a).

Subsection (f) requires that, after certificates become available for U.S. products, if the Secretary of Commerce finds that any nation is trading in illegally harvested salmon and steelhead, he is to certify that finding to the President. Such a certification is to be considered the same as a certification under the Pelly act, and will start the clock ticking toward giving the President discretionary authority to prohibit the import of seafood products from the offending country.

## Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

In accordance with rule XXVI, paragraph 11(a) of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the committee provides the following estimates of the cost of this legislation, prepared by the Congressional Budget Office.

U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
*Washington, DC, June 14, 1990.*

Hon. Claiborne Pell,
*Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,*
*U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.*

Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the attached cost estimate on the Supplemental Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1990, as ordered reported by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on June 7, 1990.

Should the committee so desire, we would be pleased to provide further details.

Sincerely,

ROBERT D. REISCHAUER,
*Director.*

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE

1. Bill number: Unassigned.

2. Bill title: Supplemental Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1990.

3. Bill status: As ordered reported by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on June 7, 1990.

4. Bill purpose: The bill authorizes an additional $616 million in year 1991 for various State Department programs, including funds for payments of arrearages to international organizations and funds for completion of the United States Embassy in Moscow. It increases, by $3 million annually, a permanent authorization for funds to reimburse state and local governments for protection of foreign missions. It also authorizes an additional $1.9 million in fiscal year 1991 for the Radio Marti Program within the United States Information Agency.

5. Estimated cost to the Federal Government:

[By fiscal year, in millions of dollars]

| | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Budget function 150: | | | | | |
| Estimated authorization | 610 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Estimated outlays | 528 | 32 | 25 | 23 | 8 |
| Budget function 300: | | | | | |
| Authorization | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Estimated outlays | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Bill total: | | | | | |
| Estimated authorization | 618 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Estimated outlays | 536 | 32 | 25 | 23 | 8 |

Basis for estimate: The estimate assumes enactment of the bill and subsequent appropriation of the authorized amounts for fiscal year 1991 by October 1, 1990. For authorizations for other years, the estimate assumes appropriation of the authorized amounts by the beginning of each year. Except as discussed below, authorization levels are stated in the bill and outlays were estimated using historical spendout rates. The details in the table may not add to the totals due to rounding.

Title I authorizes funds in addition to those in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, fiscal years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-246). Section 101 authorizes an additional $90 million in year 1991 for acquisition and maintenance of buildings abroad of which $50 million is for completion of the partially constructed United States Embassy in Moscow. The estimate assumes the $90 million will spendout consistent with historical patterns.

Section 102 authorizes an additional $474 million in year 1991 for payments of arrearages to international organizations and interna-

tional peacekeeping activities. The estimate assumes funds appropriated for arrearages will be spent in year 1991.

Section 106 provides a permanent indefinite authorization for the Permanent Association of Road Congresses, an organization funded through the Contributions to International Organizations (CIO) account. Currently the association has a permanent authorization of $3,000 per year. For 1991, the estimate assumes no budget impact because an authorization for the CIO account is contained in Public Law 101-246, and this bill does not change that authorization. After 1991, the estimate assumes costs of $10,000 per year based on the administration request of $13,000 and the absence of an outyear authorization for the CIO account.

Section 111 authorizes additional funds for reimbursements to state and local governments, a program funded within the protection of Foreign Missions and Officials (PFMO) account. It authorizes a supplemental of $3 million for year 1990, and increases an annual permanent authorization from $7 to $10 million. For fiscal years 1990 and 1991, the estimate assumes no budget impact because authorizations for the PFMO account are contained in Public Law 101-246, and this bill does not change those authorizations. After year 1991, the estimate assumes an annual appropriation of $3 million because there is no outyear authorizaton for the account.

6. Estimated cost to State and local governments: None.

7. Estimate comparison: None.

8. Previous CBO cost estimate: On May 1, 1990, CBO prepared a cost estimate on H.R. 4610, the International Affairs Authorization Act of 1990, as ordered reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Titles V and VI of that bill authorized additional appropriations for the State Department and the United States Information Agency. Title V of H.R. 4610 authorized an additional $474 million for payments of arrearages to international organizations and international peacekeeping activities but restricted payments to no more than $124 million per year. The Senate bill does not contain a similar restriction on the payment of arrearages.

Title V of H.R. 4610 authorized $300 million for construction of a new United States Embassy in Moscow. The Senate bill, however, authorizes $50 million to complete the partially constructed Embassy in Moscow.

9. Estimate prepared by: Kent R. Christensen.

10. Estimate approved by: James L. Blum, Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

## Evaluation of Regulatory Impact Statement

In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the committee has evaluated the regulatory impact that would be incurred in carrying out this bill. Section 302 establishes a program for issuing certificates of legal origin for cer-

tain fish products. Section 302(d) requires the Secretary of Commerce to promulgate certain regulations. Approximately 500 businesses and/or individuals engaged in the export of anadromous fish and fish products would be subject to these regulations. The economic impact of these regulations on affected persons and the resulting paperwork would be negligible. There will be no impact on the personal privacy of the individuals affected.

## MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR JESSE HELMS

The supplementary Authorization for the Department of State is unnecessary legislation which will cost the taxpayer over $600 million. It should not have been reported from Committee and it should not be approved by the Senate.

Throughout most of 1989, the Foreign Relations Committee labored to produce two-year authorization legislation for the Department of State and related foreign affairs agencies. The Committee held two hearings on that legislation, and spent six days marking it up. The Senate considered the legislation for six days.

The bill was finally enacted, in the form of Public Law 101-246 on February 16, at a cost to the taxpayer for fiscal year 1991 of nearly $3.7 billion—an increase of more than $350 million for the first year, and nearly $600 million for both years.

Despite the fact that the United States now faces a $3 trillion national debt, in the minds of the bureaucrats down at the State Department a $350 million increase for fiscal year 1991 is not enough. Within days of enactment of the State Authorization Bill, the State Department proposed that Congress authorize an additional $868 million for fiscal year 1991—a 22.7 percent increase over the amount just enacted for fiscal year 1991. Indeed, these supplemental funds will result in a 37 percent increase over the funds authorized for fiscal year 1990.

The fact that the State Department would seriously propose increasing its budget by 37 percent in one year shows that the State Department is out of touch with reality, and with the American people.

During Committee consideration of the supplemental authorization for the State Department, Senator Moynihan offered an amendment to reduce by $270 million the amount available to solve the problem of the unusable, new U.S. chancery in Moscow for fiscal year 1991, capping the cost of any further construction at $50 million. I was pleased to support these reductions.

Even with this amendment, however, the bill reported out by the Committee calls for an increase in the State Department budget for fiscal year 1991 of $648 million and an increase of more than $1 billion over funds authorized for fiscal year 1990.

The largest chunk of the money provided for in the Committee-reported bill is $474.8 million for the United Nations and other International organizations. As Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs John Bolton testified before the Committee, these funds are being made available to compensate the United Nations for funds which the United States had previously withheld in protest of unacceptable U.N. policy and management decisions, as well as to conform to the fiscal realities imposed by Gramm-Rudman.

However, for the United States to compensate the U.N. in the fashion proposed simply tells the world that the United States was wrong to hold back these funds in the first place. This is a signal we should not send. The United States should not apologize for opposing inept U.N. management policies and nor should it apologize for refusing to fund U.N. programs with which the American people do not agree.

Perhaps the greatest irony of the proposed supplemental is that witnesses provided by the Administration for our Committee hearings—Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs John Bolton and Under Secretary for Management Ivan Selin—*admitted to the Committee that nothing in this request is urgently needed or required* due to emergency conditions. This being the case, Senators should wonder why this bill should have been reported from the Committee in the first place.

Citizens of North Carolina and other states are eager to cut the Federal budget deficit, but not at the cost of new or increased taxes. Since neither House of Congress seems prepared to slash any Federal programs except national defense, the Federal Government appetite for more funds has not been stopped. Senators should be considering how to cut the State Department's budget—not increase it. We can save more than $600 million if this bill is not passed. And so the only responsible course is to oppose this bill.

## State Department Budget in Recent Years

The State Department's budget is a prime example of the inability of Washington to bring federal spending under control. From fical year 1986 to 1991, the budget for the State Department increased by 34 percent or nearly $1 billion. If the State Department is given the extra funds authorized in this bill, its budget will have been increased by over 50 percent, or almost $1.6 billion.

The dramatic increase in the State Department's budget is documented in the following chart (exhibit 1) and table (exhibit 2).

EXHIBIT 1

## STATE DEPARTMENT AUTHORIZATION FOR THE PAST SIX FISCAL YEARS[1]




(Amount in thousands of dollars)

[1]Amounts include all annual authorizations under the jurisdiction of the SFRC except so-called "permanent and other authorizations" (FSO Retirement Fund, Fisherman's Guaranty Fund, Fisherman's Protective Fund and Emergency Refugee Migration Assistance)

*Amount as passed in 1989 (PL 101-246)

SOURCE - Department of State

# Exhibit 2

AUTHORIZATIONS VS. APPROPRIATIONS
FIVE YEAR ANALYSIS

(Dollars in Thousands)

| | (1) 1986 AUTH 1/ PL 99-93 | (2) 1986 APPROP. PL 99-180 | (3) 1987 AUTH. PL 99-93 | (4) 1987 APPROP /3 PL 99-500 | (5) 1988 AUTH 2/ PL 100-204 | (6) 1988 APPROP. PL 100-202 | (7) 1989 AUTH 2/ PL 100-204 | (8) 1989 APPROP. PL 100-459 | (9) 1990 AUTH 2/ PL 101-246 | (10) 1990 APPROP. PL 101-16 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ADMINISTRATION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS | | | | | | | | | | |
| Salaries & Expenses - Non-Security | | | | 1,319,856 | 1,431,908 | 1,391,000 | 1,460,546 | | 1,432,124 | 1,431,874 |
| Salaries & Expenses - Security | | | | 292,528 | 350,000 | 303,000 | 357,000 | | 309,365 | 309,365 |
| Subtotal, S&E | | 1,456,700 | | 1,612,384 | 1,781,908 | 1,694,000 | 1,817,546 | 1,784,000 | 1,741,489 | 1,741,239 |
| Office of Inspector General | | | | | | | | | 21,000 | 21,000 |
| Acquis. & Maint. of Bldgs Abroad | | 337,000 | | 449,480 | 313,124 | 313,100 | 319,386 | 240,021 | 218,900 5/ | 348,100 |
| Representation Allowances | | 4,700 | | 4,460 | 4,460 | 4,500 | 4,549 | 4,590 | 4,600 | 4,600 |
| Prot. of Foreign Missions & Officials | | 9,500 | | 9,100 | 9,100 | 9,000 | 9,282 | 9,100 | 9,100 | 9,100 |
| Counter-Terrorism R&D | | | | | | | | | | |
| Emerg.in the Dipl. & Consular Service | | 4,400 | | 4,000 | 4,000 | 4,000 | 4,080 | 4,500 | 4,700 | 4,700 |
| American Institute in Taiwan | | 9,800 | | 9,379 | 9,379 | 11,000 | 9,567 | 10,890 | 11,300 | 11,300 |
| SUBTOTAL, ADMIN., FOREIGN AFFAIRS | 1,828,088 | 1,822,100 | 1,873,790 | 2,088,803 | 2,121,971 | 2,035,600 | 2,164,410 | 2,053,101 | 2,011,089 | 2,140,039 |
| INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS | | | | | | | | | | |
| Contributions to Int'l Organizations | | 463,000 | | 385,269 | 571,000 | 480,000 | 582,420 | 485,940 | 714,927 | 622,000 |
| Contr. for Int'l Peacekeeping Actv. | | 29,400 | | 29,400 | 29,400 | 29,400 | 29,988 | 29,000 | 111,184 | 81,500 |
| Int'l Conferences & Contingencies | | 6,000 | | 5,460 | 6,000 | 6,000 | 6,120 | 6,000 | 6,340 | 6,340 |
| SUBTOTAL, INT'L ORGANIZATIONS | 534,074 | 498,400 | 534,074 | 420,129 | 606,400 | 515,400 | 618,528 | 520,940 | 832,451 | 709,840 |
| INTERNATIONAL COMMISSIONS | | | | | | | | | | |
| Int'l Boundary & Water Comm. - S&E | | 11,300 | | 10,800 | 14,700 | 10,261 | 14,994 | 10,261 | 10,460 | 10,460 |
| Int'l Boundary & Water Comm. -Constr. | | 2,257 | | 3,900 | | 3,166 | | 3,166 | 11,500 | 11,500 |
| Subtotal, IBWC | | 13,557 | | 14,700 | 14,700 | 13,427 | 14,994 | 13,427 | 21,960 | 21,960 |
| American Sections: IBC | | 747 | | 720 | 721 | 734 | 735 | 884 | 750 | 750 |
| American Sections: IJC | | 3,008 | | 3,454 | 2,979 | 3,582 | 3,039 | 3,432 | 3,750 | 3,750 |
| Subtotal, American Sections | | 3,755 | | 4,174 | 3,700 | 4,316 | 3,774 | 4,316 | 4,500 | 4,500 |
| International Fisheries Commissions | | 11,300 | 4/ | 10,800 | 10,800 | 10,548 | 11,016 | 10,548 | 11,000 | 12,300 |
| SUBTOTAL, INT'L COMMISSIONS | 28,612 | 28,612 | 25,824 | 29,674 | 29,200 | 28,291 | 29,784 | 28,291 | 37,460 | 38,760 |
| OTHER PROGRAMS | | | | | | | | | | |
| U.S. Bilateral S&T Agreements | 2,000 | 2,000 | 2,000 | 1,900 | 1,900 | 1,900 | 1,938 | 2,000 | 4,000 | 4,000 |
| Soviet/East European Research | 4,800 | 4,800 | 5,000 | 4,600 | 4,600 | 13,700 | 5,000 | 4,600 | 4,600 | 4,600 |
| The Asia Foundation | 10,300 | 10,000 | 10,500 | 8,800 | 13,700 | 4,600 | 15,000 | 13,700 | 13,900 | 13,900 |
| Subtotal, Other Programs | 17,100 | 16,800 | 17,500 | 15,300 | 20,200 | 20,200 | 21,938 | 20,300 | 22,500 | 22,500 |
| SUBTOTAL, PROGRAMS ABOVE | 2,408,074 | 2,365,912 | 2,451,188 | 2,553,906 | 2,777,771 | 2,599,491 | 2,834,660 | 2,622,632 | 2,903,500 | 2,911,139 |
| FOREIGN ASSISTANCE | | | | | | | | | | |
| Migration and Refugee Assistance | 344,730 | 338,930 | 344,730 | 346,856 | 336,750 | 346,950 | 343,485 | 361,950 | 415,000 | 368,409 |
| SUBTOTAL, AUTHORIZATION BILL ACCOUNTS | 2,752,804 | 2,704,842 | 2,795,918 | 2,900,762 | 3,114,521 | 2,945,941 | 3,178,145 | 2,984,582 | 3,318,500 | 3,279,548 |

1/ - In addition to this authorization, P.L. 99-399 authorized for FY 1986-87, a total of $308,104 million for S&E, $857,806 million for Acquisition & Maintenance of Buildings Abroad, and $15 million for Counterterrorism R&D.

2/ - In addition to this authorization, P.L. 99-399 authorized $417,962 million per year for each year, 1988 through 1990.

3/ - Includes 1987 Supplemental Appropriation, P.L. 100-71.

4/ - In addition to this authorization, the Pacific Salmon Treaty (P.L. 99-5) authorized $2,225 million for International Fisheries.

5/ - Plus $129,200 million in existing authority (INMAN Security Program).

APPROPRIATED IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Transfer from DOD: | | |
| - for CIPA (P.L. 101-45).. | 112,000 | 112,000 |
| - for PRA (P.L. 101-45)... | 100,000 | 100,000 |
| Drug Initiative Act (P.L. 100-690): | | |
| - Salaries & Expenses (DA) | 9,000 | 5,000 |
| - Emerg. in Dip. and Cons. | 5,000 | - 0 - |

ADDITIONAL NOTES

- P.L. 99-93 covers 1986 and 1987.
- P.L. 100-204 covers 1988 and 1989.
- P.L. 101-246 covers 1990 and 1991.
- Accounts in Columns 1 and 3 were authorized as shown.
- &Authorized by SFRC, paid by Foreign Assistance Appropriation.

The amounts on this chart represent the aggregate of these accounts, regularly included in the State Authorization bills enacted every two years. So-called "permanent and other authorizations" are not included, as they are generally not handled as part of this legislation.

The amount in the last column on the right is the amount that would be authorized for the State Department for fiscal year 1991 under the bill reported from Committee. The second to last column represents the amount for fiscal year 1991 under legislation just signed by the President on February 16, 1990.

The Committee, then, is proposing an increase of approximately $650 million, or 18 percent over what was just enacted a few months ago, and an increase of nearly a billion dollars, or 30 percent over the amount authorized for fiscal year 1990.

The following table documents just how much the State Department budget has increased over the past few years by account.

— APRIL 26, 1990 —

FY 1991 AUTHORIZATION VS. APPROPRIATIONS

(Doc:91AUTHAP2.WK1)

| | 1991 AUTHORIZATION (PL 101-246) | 1991 APPROP. REQUEST | 1991 PL 101-246 VS. APPROP REQ. | 1991 ADDITIONAL AUTH REQUESTED | (A) 1991 TOTAL AUTH REFLECTING REQUEST | 1991 HFAC COMMITTEE TENTATIVE AUTH INCREASE | (B) 1991 HFAC COMMITTEE TENTATIVE TOTAL AUTH | 1991 SUPPLEMENTAL AUTH REQ VS. HFAC (B)-(F A/B) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **ADMINISTRATION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS** | | | | | | | | |
| Salaries & Expenses - Non-Security | 1,583,598 2/ | 1,607,423 | (23,825) | 23,825 | 1,607,423 | 77,825 | 1,661,423 | 54,000 |
| Salaries & Expenses - Security | 361,995 | 298,955 3/ | 63,040 | | 361,995 | | 361,995 | 0 |
| Subtotal, S&E | 1,945,593 | 1,906,378 | 39,215 | 23,825 | 1,969,418 | 77,825 | 2,023,418 | 54,000 |
| Office of Inspector General | 21,840 | 23,301 | (1,461) | 1,461 | 23,301 | 1,461 | 23,301 | 0 |
| Acquis. & Maint. of Bldgs Abroad | 227,656 | 317,775 | (90,119) | 90,119 | 317,775 | 52,119 | 279,775 | (38,000) |
| Moscow Embassy Construction & Security | | 270,000 3/ | (270,000) | 270,000 | 270,000 | 30,000 | 300,000 | 30,000 |
| Representation Allowances | 5,000 | 4,600 | 400 | 0 | 5,000 | 0 | 5,000 | 0 |
| Prot. of Foreign Missions & Officials | 9,464 | 9,100 | 364 | 0 | 9,464 | 0 | 9,464 | 0 |
| Emerg.in the Diol. & Consular Service | 4,888 | 6,600 | (1,712) | 1,712 | 6,600 | 1,712 | 6,600 | 0 |
| American Institute in Taiwan | 11,752 | 12,000 | (248) | 248 | 12,000 | 2,248 | 14,000 | 2,000 |
| SUBTOTAL, ADMIN., FOREIGN AFFAIRS | 2,226,193 | 2,549,754 | (323,561) | 387,365 | 2,613,558 | 165,365 | 2,661,558 | 48,000 |
| **INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS** | | | | | | | | |
| Contributions to Int'l Organizations | 817,000 | 1,158,481 | (341,481) | 341,481 | 1,158,481 | 341,481 | 1,158,481 | 0 |
| Contr. for Int'l Peacekeeping Actv. | 115,000 | 247,423 | (132,423) | 132,423 | 247,423 | 132,423 | 247,423 | 0 |
| Int'l Conferences & Contingencies | 7,320 | 8,200 | (900) | 900 | 8,200 | 900 | 8,200 | 0 |
| SUBTOTAL, INT'L ORGANIZATIONS | 939,320 | 1,414,104 | (474,804) | 474,804 | 1,414,104 | 474,804 | 1,414,104 | 0 |
| **INTERNATIONAL COMMISSIONS** | | | | | | | | |
| Int'l Boundary & Water Comm. - S&E | 10,878 | 10,500 | 378 | 0 | 10,878 | 0 | 10,878 | 0 |
| Int'l Boundary & Water Comm. -Constr. | 11,900 | 10,000 | 1,900 | 0 | 11,900 | 0 | 11,900 | 0 |
| Subtotal, IBWC | 22,778 | 20,500 | 2,278 | 0 | 22,778 | 0 | 22,778 | 0 |
| American Sections: IBC | 780 | 748 | 32 | 0 | 780 | 0 | 780 | 0 |
| American Sections: IJC | 3,900 | 3,652 | 248 | 0 | 3,900 | 0 | 3,900 | 0 |
| Subtotal, American Sections | 4,680 | 4,400 | 280 | 0 | 4,680 | 0 | 4,680 | 0 |
| International Fisheries Commissions | 11,440 | 10,700 | 740 | 0 | 11,440 | 0 | 11,440 | 0 |
| SUBTOTAL, INT'L COMMISSIONS | 38,898 | 35,600 | 3,298 | 0 | 38,898 | 0 | 38,898 | 0 |
| **OTHER PROGRAMS** | | | | | | | | |
| U.S. Bilateral S&T Agreements | 4,160 | 5,000 | (840) | 840 | 5,000 | 0 | 4,160 | (840) |
| Soviet/East European Research | 5,200 | 4,600 | 600 | 0 | 5,200 | 4,800 | 10,000 | 4,800 |
| The Asia Foundation | 18,000 | 13,978 | 4,022 | 0 | 18,000 | 0 | 18,000 | 0 |
| Subtotal, Other Programs | 27,360 | 23,578 | 3,782 | 840 | 28,200 | 4,800 | 32,160 | 3,960 |
| SUBTOTAL, AUTHORIZATION ACCOUNTS | 3,231,751 | 4,022,036 | (791,285) | 863,009 | 4,094,760 | 644,969 | 4,146,720 | 51,960 |
| **FOREIGN ASSISTANCE** | | | | | | | | |
| Migration and Refugee Assistance | 445,000 1/ | 450,648 4/ | (5,648) | 5,648 | 450,648 | 705,000 5/ | 650,000 | 199,352 |
| SUBTOTAL, AUTHORIZATION & APPROPRIATIONS | 3,676,751 | 4,472,684 | (796,933) | 868,657 | 4,545,408 | 849,969 | 4,796,720 | 251,312 |
| **PERMANENT AND OTHER AUTHORIZATION** | | | | | | | | |
| Foreign Service Retirement | 108,576 | 108,576 | 0 | 0 | 108,576 | 0 | 108,576 | 0 |
| Fishermen's Guaranty Fund | 900 | 900 | 0 | 0 | 900 | 0 | 900 | 0 |
| Fishermen's Protective Fund | 500 | 500 | 0 | 0 | 500 | 0 | 500 | 0 |
| Emergency Refugee Migration Assistance | 25,000 | 25,000 | 0 | 0 | 25,000 | 0 | 25,000 | 0 |
| Subtotal, Perm. & Other Auth. | 134,976 | 134,976 | 0 | 0 | 134,976 | 0 | 134,976 | 0 |
| TOTAL, AUTHORIZATION & APPROPRIATIONS | 3,811,727 | 4,608,660 | (796,933) | 868,657 | 4,680,384 | 849,969 | 4,931,696 | 251,312 |
| TOTAL, STATE APPROPRIATIONS ACT | 3,341,727 | 4,133,012 | (791,285) | 863,009 | 4,204,736 | 644,969 | 4,256,696 | 51,960 |

1/ — $25,000,000 of total is for assistance to refugees resettling in Israel.

2/ — Plus $300,000 in registration fees to be credited to OMC. Under H.R.4445 (HFAC tentative), increases to $700,000.

3/ — In addition to these amounts, the current budget calls for $65,000,000 to be reprogrammed from unobligated balances in the FBO Construction Program to Construction Security.

4/ — Migration and Refugee Assistance is authorized in the State Authorization Act, but is funded from Foreign Operations. The 1991 Appropriations request is shown here for purpose of comparison with the authorized amount.

5/ — The H.R.4445 Authorization Bill (Sec. 536) now in the HFAC contains this $255,300,000 increase.

## Reduction of Funds for the Moscow Chancery

The problem of the new U.S. Chancery Building in Moscow, rendered useless by Soviet intelligence penetration, remains a thorny issue. The Administration asked for $270 million to demolish the present structure above the foundation, and rebuild it under stringent security procedures.

It is difficult to determine just who is more at fault in this mater—the Soviet Union for its flagrant violation of trust, or the Department of State for allowing the Soviet Union to get away with it.

Under Section 151 of the State Department Authorization bill for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Congress issued a series of findings regarding Soviet penetration of the U.S. chancery building. Included in this section of U.S. law is a finding that the Soviet regime "has intentionally and substantially violated international agreements . . . concerning the establishment and operation of a new United States Embassy."

The statute concludes that the "Soviet Government's action constitute a material violation of international law and a substantial default in performance under the contract for construction" for the new chancery building and that the United States "is entitled to claim appropriate compensation"

Further, U.S. law recognizes that the Soviet regime has "taken steps to impair the full proper use of the present United States embassy in Moscow" and that because of these steps, United States personnel "cannot pursue their official duties in confidence."

The options commonly considered for the Chancery are two: to tear it down, or, to finish off the present structure. Since there is no method to make the present structure safe in a way which will meet security requirements, the only viable option is to tear it down and rebuild from the foundation up. If another site is sought, negotiations will require years, more funds, and further delays.

However, is it not asking too much for the U.S. taxpayers to foot the bill for the disreputable actions of the Soviet Union and the malfeasance or misfeasance of the State Department? In the option of this Senator, the Chancery building should be torn down, and the Soviet Union should be required to pay the full cost of rebuilding. Until the Soviet Union does so, the funds to proceed with the rebuilding should be taken from current State Department appropriations, with no additional monies authorized for the project. In other words, the transitional funds needed should be taken cut of the State Department's hide, not the hides of the taxpayers.

During the markup, Senator Moynihan offered langauge as follows:

> Of the amount authorized to be appropriated for the fiscal year 1991 by subsection (a)(2), $50,000,000 shall be available to complete the new chancery building of the United States embassy in Moscow and to provide additional secure space in the existing building or elsewhere on the United States embassy compound.

In addition, the $270 million requested by the Administration was reduced by $220 million.

The effect of the Moynihan amendment is to keep open the option of completing the present building, but it does not mandate the completion of the building. It simply puts a cap of $50 million on further spending, if the Administration decides to complete the building.

If the Administration decides to follow through with its proposal to tear down the present structure to its foundation, and build a truly secure facility from bottom up, then it could allocate funds for this purpose from the $317 million authorized for "Acquisition and Maintenance of Buildings Abroad" account or take funds from other accounts.

I voted for the Moynihan amendment because of the limitations it places on spending—if the completion option is chosen. Moreover, the Moynihan amendment has the additional virtue of cutting out $220 million of the $270 million that the State Department sought to cover up its mistakes.

However, I do not favor the completion option. Our intelligence community simply does not have the capabilities to neutralize the massive eavesdropping system installed into the chancery building by the Soviets. Merely completing the existing new chancery building delays solving the central problem—classified communications cannot be conducted in a secure fashion in the building.

The chancery building must be torn down, clean and simple. That is what President Reagan ordered in 1988, and what President Bush supports today. An article in The Washington Post of June 18, 1990, entitled "Unbeatable Bugs: The Moscow Embassy Fiasco," (exhibit 3) should make all Senators support the position taken by Presidents Reagan and Bush.

EXHIBIT 3

THE WASHINGTON POST MONDAY, JUNE 18, 1990 A21

# Unbeatable Bugs: The Moscow Embassy Fiasco

## *KGB Defector Says He Warned U.S. 10 Years Ago of Built-In Sensors*

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

The most startling find was buried in one of the concrete walls. Shaped like a bow tie, the device was nicknamed "Batwing." U.S. experts were stunned to find that it was a sophisticated power source that could last 100 years.

They discovered it hidden in the structure of the unfinished new U.S. Embassy building in Moscow—an eight-story office tower built by the Soviets. The building is so riddled with eavesdropping devices, U.S. officials say, that the State Department wants to tear it down and has asked Congress for $270 million to rebuild it using American materials and labor.

But according to Victor Sheymov, a former Soviet KGB major whose expertise includes communications security, he warned the U.S. government 10 years ago—just a few months after construction started—that its new Moscow chancery would be bugged with a new technology that could not be defeated short of tearing the place down. He says he told his CIA debriefers shortly after his defection in May 1980 that "you won't have a single secret in the building" if the Soviets were allowed to put it up.

"I told them the KGB was going to make the building itself a giant system of sensors that could pick up virtually anything inside the building," Sheymov said.

Despite the warnings, U.S. officials decided there was nothing the Soviets could install that could not be detected and removed. It was not until five years later that they began to realize they were badly mistaken.

Discovery of some eavesdropping equipment in the new embassy first became public in the fall of 1986 in a sharply critical Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, but it was offset by State Department assurances that the problems could be remedied "without any additional costs" or much extra effort. After a series of congressional and executive branch investigations, however, President Ronald Reagan decided in October 1988 that the entire building should be torn down. The Bush administration, hoping for a cheaper remedy, ordered new studies, but finally agreed last December that the structure should be razed.

The extent and details of the Soviet effort, which U.S. intelligence officials have equated with the $250 million cost of a shuttle flight, are still highly classified. "Batwing," for instance, is a tightly guarded secret. Sheymov's warnings have never been officially revealed.

U.S. officials, meanwhile, are still trying to figure out just how the eavesdropping system is supposed to work. Unexplained elements include gold wires connecting reinforcing rods buried in the concrete and an unusually thick upper floor where the top secret code room was to be installed.

"Our technical people were astounded at the level of sophistication," said one source. "One man from the CIA said, 'These are the kinds of things that are only on the drawing boards here.' "

In a series of recent interviews, Sheymov declined to discuss any details of the Soviet technology. He refused, for instance, to talk about "Batwing," which was disclosed by other sources, and said he knew nothing about it.

When Sheymov went public in March about some of his activities, a Bush administration spokesman familiar with his case described him as "a major defector who made a valuable contribution to our country and national security." Sheymov joined the KGB in 1971 and was assigned to the ultra-secret 8th Directorate, which at the time handled KGB communications intelligence and intercept activities. Following his defection and a year of CIA debriefings, he was awarded the U.S. Intelligence Medal.

Excavation work for the new U.S. Embassy complex in Moscow began on Nov. 22, 1979, under a contract with Soyuzvneshstroyimport, a Soviet government firm. Digging and pile-driving were still underway when, on May 16, 1980, the CIA smuggled Sheymov and his wife and child out of Moscow.

Sheymov said one of the first things he told the CIA was that he knew of "the general plans and capabilities that would be used in penetrating the new embassy, but not all the details."

He said a "special enterprise," which runs a factory near a Moscow subway stop and a concrete plant on the city's outskirts, was assigned "to deal with the building materials for the U.S. Embassy, using a rather sophisticated technique."

The result, a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee said years later, was "a building that is essentially an eight-story microphone plugged into the Politburo."

The concrete columns and beams for the job were prefabricated by the "special enterprise," which Sheymov said was controlled by the KGB's 8th and 16th directorates. The 16th Directorate was spun out

of the 8th to take over all communications intercept activities.

U.S. officials have said they were denied permission to visit the site where the precast beams and columns were being poured.

According to Sheymov, installation of the prefabricated items was only one round of the bugging. Another, he said, involved digging tunnels to the foundation walls. From there, he said, KGB technicians could drill into the basement walls and then upwards, creating channels to send listening and even video devices to the topmost floors.

The next round of bugging, Sheymov said, would be an open-ended one, installing additional devices in furniture, office equipment, "whatever they can get their hands on."

"The KGB is known for the redundancy of its operations," Sheymov said. If the same conversation is picked up by more than one device, he said, each intercept is separately transcribed, to make sure nothing is missed.

U.S. officials said they knew the Soviets would make every effort to install eavesdropping devices in the new building, but they failed to appreciate the magnitude of the effort. "The proper decision at that time [in 1980] would have been to scrap all the plans, regain control of the site and start again," Sheymov said.

Instead, an interagency committee headed by the CIA decided to let the Soviets install the bugs on the assumption that U.S. experts could tear them out when that phase of the construction was done.

"It was so naive," said a State Department official familiar with the strategy. "The CIA decided to let the Russians do the building, then throw them out and spend three months taking the bugs out. . . . We didn't realize that if you took them all out, you were undermining the structure."

Abnormalities in the construction work began showing up as early as 1982, indicating "extensive Soviet bugging of the structure," according to a 1987 Senate intelligence committee report.

U.S. concerns were heightened in 1984 by the discovery of bugs in electric typewriters in use for years at the old embassy on Tchaikovsky Street and at the consulate in Leningrad. U.S. officials were tipped off by French intelligence that various pieces of equipment might have been compromised. It took months for National Security Agency experts to find the bugs. Insulated wires were hidden inside typewriter springs and even screws were hollowed out to use power from the machine itself.

"The typewriters showed that the Soviets had a technical competence of which we were not aware," said another source, a former Reagan White House official. "We said, 'Holy smoke, this is pretty good stuff.' "

As for the new building rising on nearby Konyushkovskaya Street, this official said the fact that whatever the KGB was doing was "not well understood" was seen as a reason to let the work continue. "There was a premium on not doing anything until you know what's going on," he said. "By 1984-85, we had great suspicions that the thing was a giant antenna—or a giant woofer."

Finally, the Soviets were locked out without warning in August 1985, with their part of the work almost done. About $23 million of the $65 million in the U.S. budget for the project had been spent.

It took exhaustive testing to find out what had been done. Technical counterintelligence teams, assuming some bugs were active, worked around the clock in silence. Walls were torn out. Special neutron X-ray equipment was brought in.

Bugs eventually were found in the precast concrete along with a hodgepodge of diodes and other items tossed in to frustrate the search.

"It wasn't just diodes, it was literally junk," said former representative Dan Mica (D-Fla.), who investigated security breaches in Moscow as a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee chairman. "They put in tin cans, pipes, wrenches. If you tried to take all those things out, you'd be left with a structure worse than Swiss cheese."

According to several sources—confirming and adding to details first reported in Ronald Kessler's 1989 book, "Moscow Station"—other bugs were found in spots where metal I-beams were welded together. The bugs were composed of materials with the same density as the metal so that normal X-rays could not detect them.

In addition, the sources said, steel reinforcing rods set into the concrete were cut into varying lengths, apparently so they could serve as antennas. Elements of the building were configured so that microwaves could be directed at it from a KGB post and they would bounce back, with the waves changed or modulated by the voices, sounds and waves they picked up at the embassy.

Suspicions about the KGB post centered on a church across the street, which investigators dubbed "Our Lady of Telemetry."

"It gives off a lot of energy," said a House staff member.

Despite the discoveries, a State Department official who asked not to be named said that the CIA was insisting as late as January 1987 "that we could neutralize anything in the building."

But in June 1987, former CIA director and defense secretary James R. Schlesinger, working as a special State Department consultant, reported that the Soviets had "extensively salted" the new building "with a full array of intelligence devices for which we do not yet understand either the technology or the underlying strategy."

Official inquiries proliferated. The State Department, already under fire for security breaches at the old embassy, was widely castigated for being too lax. Officials at State felt the CIA got off too lightly.

The problems were traced back as far as December 1972, when the Nixon White House, anxious to get Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev to come here for a summit meeting, agreed to let the Soviets put up the basic structure in accord with Moscow "norms and rules."

The State Department objected to the arrangement, and then-Assistant Secretary of State Walter J. Stoessel Jr. signed it under protest. But the door was opened to the use of Soviet labor as well as off-site casting of concrete columns and beams.

The State Department is now seeking Moscow's approval to rebuild with U.S. materials and labor.

Sheymov said he believed his warnings were taken seriously at the CIA and conveyed to the State Department "at a very high level."

That, however, was not clear. In 1987, then-Assistant Secretary of State Robert E. Lamb, in charge of diplomatic security, indicated to a House subcommittee that U.S. officials did not foresee the possibility that the Soviets would use "the structure itself as part of the bugging."

The CIA declined to comment.

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*Staff researchers Bruce Brown and Ralph Gaillard Jr. contributed to this report.*



ASSOCIATED PRESS

New U.S. Embassy in Moscow has been described as "essentially an eight-story microphone plugged into the Politburo."




**U.S. Embassy In Moscow**

- Designed by U.S. architectural firm and Soviet engineer
- Cost so far: $190 million
- Assembled from prefabricated modules built at Soviet site not subject to U.S. inspection
- Originally scheduled for 1983 opening at cost of $90 million

THE WASHINGTON POST

The article reports that a former Soviet KGB major warned the U.S. Government ten years ago that our new chancery in Moscow would be bugged "with a new technology that coiuld not be defeated short of tearing the place down." Regrettably, these warnings were ignored and the major's predictions came to pass.

I voted for the Moynihan amendment only because it limited spending on the completion option if it were chosen. Moreover, it supported my objective of preventing the authorization of additional funds to be put up by the U.S. taxpayer for fixing the Moscow Embassy fiasco—whatever option is undertaken. The taxpayer did not cause this fiasco, and should not be held liable for the errors of the State Department and the dishonesty of the Soviets.

When the Committee Bill is taken up on the floor, it should be amended to mandate the demolition of the present building to the foundation level, as the Administration wants, authorize the contruction of a new building on that foundation, but leave the funding of the new construction up to the State Department to obtain either from its current budget or from the Soviet Union. Perhaps this method will encourage our diplomats to obtain compensation from the Soviet Union as soon as possible.

## United Nations Arrearages

The Senate must reject attempts to authorize funds for payment of so-called arrearages to the United Nations and other international organizations. The amount provided for in this bill—$474 million—is not needed by the United Nations and its sister organizations, and is not anticipated in its budget.

It is a windfall, pure and simple, which will encourage the mindless proliferation of new programs. We should not ask the American taxpayer to put up unnecessary funding at a time when the federal debt is $3 trillion, and some are urging that new or increased taxes be on the table at the budget summit. Indeed, if these funds are provided, the U.N. would have a surplus which could be used to lower the assessments of other countries under U.N. accounting rules.

As most Senators, but few taxpayers, know, 25 percent of the United Nations basic budget comes from the American taxpayers. These are called "assessed contributions" in international parlance. On top of that, the United States frequently doles out "voluntary contributions" for specific agencies or purposes within the United Nations international system.

There are eight U.N. organizations which assess the United States for 25 percent of their regular budget. These are the (1) United Nations, (2) Food and Agriculture Organization, (3) International Atomic Energy Agency, (4) International Civil Aviation Organization, (5) International Labor Organization, (6) United Nations Industrial Development Organization, (7) World Health Organization, and (8) World Meteorological Organization.

An "arrearage," according to the State Department, is any amount that the United Nations claims is owed by the United States. Arrearages include:

1. Amounts Congress withheld from international organizations to leverage changes in the organization's policies or budgeting practices;

2. Amounts withheld in those instances in which Congress prohibited the expediture of certain funds—such as assistance that would go to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); and,

3. Amounts the U.N. claims it is owed from those years in which Congress saw fit to appropriate less money for the U.N. than the U.N. had demanded.

The following table, (Exhibit 4) provided by the General Accounting Office, shows estimated cumulative U.S. withholdings through fiscal year 1989 for the above eight UN organizations. Included for comparision purposes are the calendar year 1988 U.S. assessments for each organization.

EXHIBIT 4

Dollars in millions

| Organization | Withholdings | Cumulative 1988 assessment[a] |
|---|---|---|
| United Nations | $279 | $214 |
| Food and Agriculture Organization | 82 | 65 |
| International Atomic Energy Agency | 1 | 39 |
| International Civil Aviation Organization | 2 | 8 |
| International Labor Organization | 27 | 41 |
| United Nations Industrial Development Organization | 18 | 21 |
| World Health Organization | 28 | 75 |
| World Meteorological Organization | 3 | 9 |
| **Total** | **$440** | **$472** |

Source: Department of State

[a]U.S. fiscal year 1989 appropriations fund calendar year 1988 assessments. The numbers provided represent the Department of State's estimate of U.S. requirements based on January 1988 exchange rates and certain adjustments.

It is important to recognize that many United nations voluntary programs—such as the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) and UNICEF—have been generously funded by Congress, and that "arrearages" are not being asked for such programs.

Most of the funds which the United Nations and itsd affiliated organizations claim to be owed by the American taxpayer resulted from those instances in which funds appropriated by the Congress fell below the amounts requested by the international organizations. For fiscal years 1986 through 1989, Congress provided the U.N. and its agencies with $300 million less than it had assessed the U.S. in this manner.

These funds were withheld as part of a larger U.S. policy of reducing federal expenditures. For example, in fiscal year 1986, $18 million was withheld pursuant to a 4.3 percent sequestration required under Public Law 99-177, commonly referred to as the "Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act."

Also, for fiscal year 1989, Congress limited the State Department's budget to a 2 percent increase over the level appropriated

for fiscal year 1988. This policy resulted in an appropriation shortfall of about $140 million for fiscal year 1989 both because the United Nations and its organizations increased the amount it assessed the United States for that year, and because the amount appropriated for fiscal year 1988 (the baseline upon which the fiscal year 1989 budget was set) was less than what the U.N. and its organizations had assessed the U.S. for that year.

Approximately $15 million of the amount claimed to be "owed" by the United States was withheld pursuant to provisions which prohibit the use of U.S. contributions to fund certain United Nations programs which Congress has found to be counter to United States interests. For example, under Section 114 of Public Law 98-164, no U.S. funds are used to support programs which benefit the terrorist Palestine Liberation Organization. This is the only amount the State Department does not intend to pay.

The remainder of the funds claimed by the United Nations to be in "arrears" were withheld in an effort to stimulate reforms in the United Nations system, primarily changes in the procedure by which budget decisions are undertake and in tax equalization fund assessments.

Most of these funds were withheld pursuant to Sec. 143 of Public Law 99-93, commonly referred to as the Kassebaum amendment. Under this provision the U.S. assessed contribution to the United Nations and its specialized agencies could not exeed 20 percent of the total budgets of those organizations for fiscal year 1987 and following years unless those agencies adopt procedures which grant voting rights on budgetary matters proportionate to budget contribution by each member state.

In 1987, Congress modified the Kassebaum amendment (Section 702, Public Law 100-204) establishing a 3 part payment procedure including a presidential report on the progress of reforms at the United Nations and the specialized agencies.

In expectation of a reduction of United States payments, the United Nations used reserve funds and some retained budget surpluses from prior years. In addition, it claims to have taken a number of administrative and budgetary measures to reduce its expenditures—measures that should have been taken long before. For example, travel was curtailed, as was the use of consultants, and recruitment of personnel and promotions were frozen; but there were practices which should never have been allowed in the first place.5

The United Nations asserts that it reduced expenditures by approximately $220 million in 1986 and 1987. But, anyone who knows the United Nations, with its bloated bureaucracy and exorbitant salaries, recognizes that it could be cut a great deal more.

In fact, a recent report by the General Accounting Office included an assessment by U.S. officials that the economy measures undertaken by the United Nations were "largely a short-term reaction to the financial crises rather than a systematic reconsideration by those agencies of their operating structures. For example cost savings due to personnel reductions were achieved by not filling vacant posts, rather than by restructuring organizations and eliminating positions."

The GAO did find that in 1986 and 1987, U.N. agencies adopted some form of so-called "consensus-based budget decision-making procedure." However, it also concluded that "because the economy measures taken by the U.N. organizations in 1986 and 1987 were largely a temporary response to their immediate financial problems, it is uncertain whether the new budget procedures will, in the long term, achieve the U.S. objective of reducing budget grown in the U.N. organizations." In addition, proportionate voting procedures over budgetary issues, as called for in the original Kassebaum amendment, have not yet been instituted. It is far too early to give up our leverage.

On February 16 of this year, President Bush signed Public Law 101-246. This was the regular, two-year authorization for the State Department and related agencies. For the first time in many years, that legislation included full funding for assessed and voluntary contributions to the United Nations with the exception of a few programs (like those that benefit the PLO). In short, in enacting this bill, the Congress has determined no longer to punish the U.N. for wasting our taxpayers funds. The supplemental, however, is asking for the payment of dues withheld in previous years.

Now an attempt to pump nearly $475 million in additional funds to the United Nations over five years is underway and provided for in this bill. Supporters of this authorization for international organization arrearages have had a difficult time justifying their stance. For some supporters it is apparently enough that the Administration has requested the funds. Others actually refer to the United States as a "deadbeat" for not paying "its debts." Neither argument is strong enough to convince this Senator that $475 million more should be handed over to the United Nations.

Senators should carefully examine whether the allegedly pressing need to commit the American taxpayer to pay U.N. arrearages is enough to drive this legislation to final passage.

No harm has come to the U.N. because the U.S. declined to pay. The United Nations has already adjusted downward its spending because of past U.S. decisions to withhold funds. If the United Nations is currently operating at a level equal with its revenue sources, a repayment of U.S. arrearages will result in a surplus. So the United Nations simply does not need $475 million more from the U.S. taxpayer.

As the General Accounting Office concluded:

> Furthermore, the amounts * * * were originally assessed primarily for activities that were budgeted and programmed in prior fiscal years. U.S. officials said, that in principle, the money is no longer needed for those activities because, if they were rescheduled in subsequent fiscal years, they were included in the new budgets.

In addition, the United Nations has not given any indication of how it would spend the money it would receive as a windfall from the United States. This is something about which Senators should be concerned. In its recent report, the GAO also warned that "it is important that any arrearage payments be made in such a way as to avoid unplanned program growth."

The senior figure in America's international organization policy-making, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, John Bolton, could not give assurances that the money will not just sit in the bank or be used to increase the U.N. budget—which will increase U.S. assessments in later years, or be returned to the Soviet Union, China or other countries.

In fact, under UN accounting rules, every surplus dollar could result in reductions of 10 cent reductions in the Japanese and German assessments and a 13 cent reduction in the Soviet assessment.

During a hearing of the Committee on May 23, I asked Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, John Bolton, if he knew how the U.N. would spend the arrearage money, if it were made available. Mr. Bolton, one of America's premier public servants, honestly said he did not have an answer.

So I asked Mr. Bolton what would happen to arrearage money if it did not go to projects. Would it go into some general fund—or even be refunded to the Soviet Union, China, and other member states at the same rate as they make assessed contributions? Mr. Bolton said arrearage money would go into a bank account or "short-term money instruments." I then askd if he thought the money would be returned to member states, and Mr. Bolton replied, "It would certainly be our intention that that not happen." He then promised to guard against that happening. But there is no way to be certain that U.S. funds will not be used to rebate funds to other countries.

Other powerful reasons exist for opposing payment of United Nations arrearages. Whether for budget restraint or policy purposes, the U.S. held back funding in the past. To open the floodgate now and dump half a billion dollars into international organizations sends a strong signal that the United States was wrong to trim funding in the first place.

In addition, payment of arrearages would give the United Nations a financial cushion that would make it much more difficult for the U.S. to use financial leverage to influence, in coming years, United Nations budget practices, policy decisions, or support for international groups such as the terrorist Palestine Liberation Organization.

Finally, payment of the arrearages is an unconscionable raid of the Treasury. That may not give pause to every Senator, in light of the amounts lavished on endless numbers of other programs. But it should be a concern to protectors of the public purse, who will be rightly held to account for their position for or against this authorization.

The United Nations does not need nearly a half a billion more dollars from the U.S. taxpayer, and the United States government can not afford to hand these kinds of sums over to the United Nations. We have no idea how the United Nations will spend this windfall, or whether it will be used in such a way as to increase the amount the United States is assessed in the future. The half a billion dollar windfall will diminish the ability of the United States to influence UN policies and will be taken as an apology for our withholding past funds. The sections providing for arrearages to

the United Nations should be stricken from this legislation when it reaches the floor.

### Provisions To Extend the Authorization for au pair Programs

While I oppose the increase in funds for the State Department authorized in the Committee bill, there are some provisions not requiring additional funds which merit the support of Senators. If the Committee bill does not pass the Senate, and I hope it does not, these provisions should be included in other legislation which does merit approval by the Senate. Section 204 of the Committee bill authorizes the continuation of au pair programs under the direction of USIA until such time as another agency of the United States is authorized to implement the porograms.

Four years ago, USIA, in conjunction with the American Institute for Foreign Study and the Experiment in International Living, initiated a new program known as "Au Pair in America." This program provides young people from Europe within opportunity to live with an American family in the United States for one year. During that year, the "au pairs" are responsible for providing child care for their American families.

To date, this program has been an enormous success, providing the visiting youths with rich cultural experiences and appreciations for the American way of life. The au pairs have come from more than a dozen European countries and have been placed in over one hundred communities across America.

The participants in this program travel to the United States under the J-1 Visa, that is administered by the Director of USIA pursuant to the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961. This provision merely authorizes the continuation of this program within USIA until such time as another agency is authorized to implement the programs.

### Chinese Missile Sales to the Middle East

Section 301 of the Committee bill addresses an issue Senators have considered previously. The provision is almost identical to provisions passed by the Senate in 1988 as part of the fiscal year 1989 Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill and then again in 1989 as part of the Support for Eastern European Democracy Act. Both times it was dropped in conference at the insistence of the House.

The provision simply states that the United States government shall not assist any missile program of Communist China, directly or indirectly, and shall revoke any previously authorized export of U.S. satellites for launch on Chinese missiles, until the President certifies that China is not currently supplying ballistic missiles, missile technology, or poison gas to Iran, Iraq, Syria or Libya, or has provided reasonable assurances that no future sales of missiles, missile technology or poison gas to such countries are planned.

Over the past couple of years many Senators have grown concerned about reports that Communist China may be preparing to send deadly advanced ballistic missiles to countries some of the most anti-American countries in the Middle East, particularly Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya.

Despite these reports, the United States is actually facilitating the gain by the Chinese missile program of badly needed money, technology, and prestige. It has done so by approving the export of U.S. satellites for launch of Chinese missiles.

The first satellite approved for export has already been launched. But two other satellites have yet to be exported. This provison provides a very simple yet important directive. It would revoke the licenses issued for export of these satellites and would prevent any other assistance to the Chinese missile program unless and until Congress is assured that China is committed to not sending missiles to these countries.

The proliferation of advanced military weaponry in the Middle East is a troubling development, and a direct threat to America's interests in a secure Israel and the preservation of a stable Middle East from which oil can be readily obtained.

Concerns about Chinese efforts to peddle advanced missiles to the Middle East surfaces in 1988 after the unexpected sale of Chinese CSS–2 "East Wind" intermediate-range ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia. These missiles have a range of over 3000 kilometers and are capable of carrying either conventional, chemical or nuclear warheads. The Saudis have provided the United States with assurances that these missiles will not carry non-conventional warheads.

Shortly after the CSS–2 sale was revealed, attention turned to the insatiable appetite for arms of Syrian strongman Hafez al-Assad. Since the late 1970s, when Egypt signed the Camp Daivd Accords, Assad has pursued a program aimed at achieving unilateral strategic parity with Israel so as to enable him to fight a war against Israel without having to depend upon other Arab states for assistance.

Over recent years, Syrian personnel and equipment levels have grown to surpass Israeli levels in troops, tanks, artillery, and combat aircraft. The last time Syria met Israel in battle, during the air war over Lebanon in 1982, the Israeli Air Force scored a kill ratio of 86.1 in dogfights with Syrian pilots.

Since Assad cannot rely upon Syrian pilots to reach targets in Israel, he imported short range Soviet-built surface to surface missiles, and sought to obtain intermediate range SS–23 missiles. However, under the terms of the INF Treaty, the Soviet Union was required to destroy all of its SS–23s and was preempted from transferring any of these missiles to any third country.

In part because of the Syrian demand for these missiles, which were no longer available, China developed the M–9 missile, which reportedly shares characteristics of the Soviet SS–23. In addition, the state-of-the art M–9 reportedly boasts greater accuracy, shorter preparation time, and more mobility than the missiles China has provided Saudi Arabia.

Over the past couple of years, reports have regularly surfaced suggesting that a deal has been made between Syria and China whereby M–9 missiles will be transferred to Syria. Procurement of the Chinese M–9 might boost Assad's confidence to the level necessary for him to initiate hostilities against Israel—or moderate Arab states unwilling to abide by his will. This provision is aimed at preventing the Chinese from transferring such missiles to Syria.

In recent weeks the media has reported numerous threats by Iraq President Saddem Hussein to use poison gas against the population of Israel. Iraq now claims to have obtained nuclear triggers necessary for it to manufacture nuclear weapons. This provision will help prevent Iraq from obtaining missiles which could be used to drop nuclear or chemical weapons on Israel or on moderate Arab countries.

Similarly, the transfer of missiles or missile technology to any of the other countries listed in this provision would give these countries the ability to send chemical weapons once described as "the poor man's nuclear weapon" to any of their enemies and commit genocide.

More than one year ago, CIA Director William Webster testified to the Committee that Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya are actively attempting to develop heinous chemical weapons. There are also reports that the March 1990 fire at the Libyan chemical weapons factory at Rabta was a hoax and that the Libyans may be attempting to build a second factory.

Despite recurring reports of Chinese intentions to sell ballistic missiles to Middle Eastern countries, since 1988, the United States has reportedly received numerous promises from China that it would not sell ballistic missiles to countries in the region. It has been on the basis of these assurances that Congress has not taken steps to place sanctions on China for any sale of missiles to Syria.

On September 30, 1988, the Senate passed an amendment I offered to the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1989 which was almost identical to Section 301 of the Committee bill.

The amendment was deleted by the House of Representatives after it was announced on the floor of the House that then-Secretary of Defense Carlucci had received assurances from the Chinese during a trip to Communist China earlier in that month that missile sales to the Middle East would be restrained. On a visit to China in February 1989, President Bush was reportedly treated to a replay of the assurances given to Carlucci.

Yet, during the ensuring months, a number of news reports emanating from the Middle East suggested that China was going ahead with plans to sell missiles to Syria. Indeed, one report indicated that the deal had actually been consummated. In a New York Times article of November 7, 1989, it was reported that "a senior administration official said * * * that the United States is concerned that China may drop its commitment not to sell medium range missiles or the technology to make them."

The Times article is important because it indicated that the Chinese commitment extended to just "median range" missile sales to the Middle East and because it also reported that Administration specialists were unclear on some aspects of the Chinese commitment, such as how it defines a medium-range missile.

Under the INF Treaty, the M-9, with a reported range of 600 kilometers, would be considered an intermediate range missile. However, if the Chinese consider their M-9 to be less than medium-range, then the much trumpeted Chinese commitment would be a hollow commitment not to sell to Middle Eastern countries missiles

it had not intended to sell, but which would allow the sale of missiles (M–9) which it had intended to all along.

In response to the Times' and other reports, the Senate on November 13, 1989, approved an amendment I sponsored to the Support for Eastern European Democracy Act which again would have prevented U.S. assistance to China's missile programs.

Only days after this Senate action, and prior to the Conference Commitee on the Support for Eastern European Democracy Aid bill, the Administration again assured Senators that China was not intending to send missiles to Syria.

In a hearing before the Foreign Relations Committee on November 17, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Clarke told the Committee that "[I]t would be a grave error * * * on part of the Chinese if they proceeded with a missle sale * * * it would be extraordinarily damaging to U.S.-Chinese relations if * * * they went ahead with a sale in the Middle East."

With this assurance, the Conference Committee on the Support for Eastern European Democracy bill dropped the provision regarding Chinese missile sales.

But, no sooner had this provision been dropped than reports again surfaced regarding Chinese missile sales to Syria. An article in the Jerusalem Post of December 12 reported that Syria and China had signed a contract for 140 M–9 missiles.

In January, the London-based Arabic language publication Al Majallah carried a report entitled "China Determined to Arm Syria" which said, "[T]he Syrian Government has officially received assurances from the Chinese Government of its commitment to military cooperation between the two countries. Al Majallah has learned China pointed to pressure from the United States during a visit to Beijing by U.S. National Security Advisor Scowcroft three weeks ago, and that the U.S. demands in that regard were rejected."

An article in the Washington Times of January 12 echoed reports of a China-Syria deal on M–9s. According to the article "evidence continues to mount that Beijing is selling" missiles to Syria, and "U.S. experts take seriously reports that China has sold * * * M–9, missiles to Syria."

On March 29, 1990, the Washington Post reported that Western diplomats believed that China was getting ready to ship short-range missiles to Iran or Iraq. These missiles have a range of 50 to 60 miles and were designed especially for export. As a West European diplomat is quoted as having said, "maybe the Chinese feel that the relationship with the United States is so bad that they can take risk of selling these missiles—for the next two or three years. This means that they need money.

On June 6, 1990, during a hearing on Sino-American Relations, Senators on the Committee heard a representative from the State Department try to explain to Senator Biden why we have so many problems working with the Communist Chinese over their transfer of missiles and missile technology to other countries. The State Department witnesses again testified that the Chinese have pledged to not send these missiles to the region.

It is difficult to determine whom to believe. But, if in fact the President says that such missile transfers are not taking place, and

that he has received reliable commitments from the Communist Chinese, then the prohibitions in this Section shall be waived. But if the Chinese are attempting to peddle missiles to such virulently anti-American regimes as Iraq, Syria, Iran and Libya, then the United States should not, and indeed must not, help the Communist Chinese develop their missile program.

JESSE HELMS.

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman):

FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL YEARS 1988 AND 1989

## TITLE I—THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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### PART D—DIPLOMATIC RECIPROCITY AND SECURITY

SEC. 151. UNITED STATES-SOVIET EMBASSY AGREEMENTS; PROHIBITIONS ON USE OF MT. ALTO SITE.

(a) * * *

* * * * * * *

(c) WAIVER.—

(1) * * *

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(B) steps have been or will be taken that will ensure that the new chancery building to be occupied by the United State Embassy in Moscow can be safely and securely used for its intended purposes *or that additional secure space has been provided in the existing building or elsewhere on the United States embassy compound*; and

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FOREIGN RELATION AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL YEARS 1990 AND 1991

## TITLE I—DEPARTMENT OF STATE

### PART A—AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS; ALLOCATIONS OF FUNDS; RESTRICTIONS

SEC. 101. ADMINISTRATION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

(a) * * *

(1) SALARIES AND EXPENSES.—For "Salaries and Expenses", of the Department of State $1,432,124,000 for the fiscal year 1990 and [$1,583,598,000] *$1,615,423,000* for the fiscal year 1991, of which not less than $250,000 for each fiscal year shall be avail-

able only for use by the Bureau of International Communications and Information Policy to support international institutinal development and other activities which promote international communications and information development.

(2) ACQUISITION AND MAINTENANCE OF BUILDINGS ABROAD.—For "Acquisition and Maintenance of Buildings Abroad", $218,900,000 for the fiscal year 1990 and [$227,656,000] *$317,156,000* for the fiscal year 1991.

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(4) EMERGENCIES IN THE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR SERVICE.—For "Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Service", $4,700,000 for the fiscal year 1990 and [$4,888,000] *$6,600,000* for the fiscal year 1991.

(5) OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL.—For "Office of the Inspector General", $21,000,000 for the fiscal year 1990 and [$21,840,000] *$23,301,000* for the fiscal year 1991.

(6) PAYMENT TO THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE IN TAIWAN.—For "Payment to the American Institute in Taiwan", $11,300,000 for the fiscal year 1990 and [$11,752,000] *$14,000,000* for the fiscal year 1991.

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*(d) MOSCOW EMBASSY CONSTRUCTION AND SECURITY.—(1) Of the amount authorized to be appropriated for the fiscal year 1991 by subsection (a)(2), $50,000,000 shall be available to complete the new chancery building of the United States embassy in Moscow and to provide additional secure space in the existing building or elsewhere on the United States embassy compound.*

*(2) Not less than 15 days before the obligating funds made available under paragraph (1), the Secretary of State shall notify the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate in accordance with the reprogramming procedures applicable under section 34 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2706).*

*(3) The Secretary of State may not permit the Soviet Union to occupy the new chancery building at its new embassy complex in Washington, District of Columbia, or any other new chancery building in the Washington metropolitan area, until a new secure chancery building is ready for occupancy for the United States Embassy in Moscow.*

SEC. 102. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES.

(a) ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.—

(1) There are authorized to be appropriated for "Contributions to International Organizations", $714,927,000 for the fiscal year 1990 and [$817,000,000] *$1,158,481,000* for the fiscal year 1991 for the Department of State to carry out the authorities, functions, duties, and responsibilities in the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States with respect to international organizations and for other purposes authorized by law.

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(b) CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES.—There are authorized to be appropriated for "Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities", $111,184,000 for the fiscal year 1990 and [$115,000,000] *$247,423,000* for the fiscal year 1991 for the Department of State to carry out the authorities, functions, duties, and responsibilities in the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States with respect to international peacekeeping activities and for other purposes authorized by law.

(c) INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES AND CONTINGENCIES.—There are authorized to be appropriated for "International Conferences and Contingencies", $6,340,000 for the fiscal year 1990 and [$7,300,000] *$8,200,000* for the fiscal year 1991 for the Department of State to carry out the authorities, functions, duties, and responsibilities in the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States with respect to international conferences and contingencies and for other purposes authorized by law.

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*(d) CONTINUED AVAILABILITY OF CERTAIN FUNDS.—Funds made available pursuant to this section for fiscal year 1991 for the payment by the United States of assessed contributions for prior years to international organizations are ~~authorized~~ to remain available until expended.*

SEC. 103. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSIONS.

*(a) IN GENERAL.*—The following amounts are authorized to be appropriated under "International Commissions" for the Department of State to carry out the authorities, functions, duties, and responsibilities in the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States and for other purposes authorized by law:

(1) * * *

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(4) INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES COMMISSIONS.—For "International Fisheries Commissions", $11,000,000 for the fiscal year 1990 and [$11,440,000] *$18,840,000* for the fiscal year 1991.

*(b) GREAT LAKES FISHERY COMMISSION.—Of the amount authorized to be appropriated for the fiscal year 1991 by subsection (a)(4)—*

*(1) $6,640,000 shall be available for the Great Lakes Fishery Commission's Sea Lamprey Control Program; and*

*(2) $6,000,000 shall be made available by the Secretary of State, by grant or otherwise, to the Great Lakes Fishery Commission for the purpose of enabling the Commission to establish and implement a program for the management and control of Zebra Mussels in the Great Lakes.*

SEC. 104. MIGRATION AND REFUGEE ASSISTANCE.

(a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated for "Migration and Refugee Assistance"—

(1) for authorized activities, $~~415~~,000,000 for the fiscal year 1990 and [$445,000,000] *$450,898,000* for the fiscal year 1991; and

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SEC. 105. OTHER PROGRAMS.

The following amounts are authorized to be appropriated for the Department of State to carry out the authorities, functions, duties, and responsibilities in the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States and for other purposes authorized by law:

(1) UNITED STATES BILATERAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGREEMENTS.—For "United States Bilateral Science and Technology Agreements", $4,000,000 for the fiscal year 1990 and [$4,160,000] *$5,000,000* for the fiscal year 1991.

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# TITLE II—UNITED STATES INFORMATIONAL, EDUCATIONAL, AND CULTURAL PROGRAMS

## PART A—UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

(a) * * *

(b)[SEVILLE WORLD'S FAIR.—] *INTERNATIONAL EXPOSITIONS.*—(1) Subject to paragraph (2), there are authorized to be appropriated to the United States Information Agency for fiscal year 1990 $7,300,000 for United States participation in the [World's Fair in Seville, Spain] *International Expositions in Seville, Spain, and Genoa, Italy.*

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## PART C—VOICE OF AMERICA

SEC. 231. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

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(1) * * *

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(3) RADIO BROADCASTING TO CUBA.—For "Radio Broadcasting to Cuba", $12,700,000 for fiscal year 1990 and [$13,208,000 for the fiscal year 1991] *$15,069,000 for the fiscal year 1991.*

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DEPARTMENTS OF COMMERCE, JUSTICE, AND STATE, THE JUDICIARY AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATION ACT 1988

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GENERAL PROVISIONS—DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SEC. 301. * * *

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[SEC. 304. The Secretary of State shall not permit the Soviet Union to occupy the new chancery building at its new embassy complex in Washington, D.C. or any other new facility in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, until a new chancery building is ready for occupancy for the United States embassy in Moscow: *Provided,* That none of the funds appropriated in this Act or any

prior Act may be obligated for the new office building in Moscow except for engineering and technical studies prior to October 1, 1988.]

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# UNITED STATES CODE

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## TITLE 3—THE PRESIDENT

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### § 208. Reimbursement of State and local governments

(a) In carrying out the functions pursuant to section [202(7),] *202(8)* the Secretary of Treasury may utilize, with their consent; on a reimbursable basis, the services, personnel, equipment, and facilities of State and local governments, and is authorized to reimburse such State and local governments for the utilization of such services, personnel, equipment, and facilities. The Secretary of Treasury may carry out the functions pursuant to section [202(7)] *202(8)* by contract. The authority of this subsection may be transferred by the President to the Secretary of State. In carrying out any duty under section [202(7),] *202(8)* the Secretary of State is authorized to utilize any authority available to the Secretary under title II of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956.

(b) There is authorized to be appropriated, in addition to such sums as have been heretofore appropriated under this section—

(1) [$7,000,000] *$10,000,000* for each fiscal year beginning after September 30, 1982, for the payment of reimbursement obligations entered into under subsection (a) after such date; and

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## TITLE 22—FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE

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### § 269. Permanent Association of International Road Congresses; authorization of annual appropriations for membership

There is hereby authorized to be appropriated, out of any sums in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, [not exceeding $3,000 per annum] *such sums as may be necessary for each fiscal year* to enable the United States to accept membership in the Permanent Association of International Road Congresses.

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